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Introduction
The Waitaki River in South Canterbury is a
significant and precious natural resource. At
209 kilometres long, draining a catchment area
of 976 000 hectares, it provides for a multitude
of uses and activities. Fishing and jet boating
are popular on the Waitaki and the
surrounding land use is changing and
intensifying with increased irrigation. The
upper and middle reaches of the Waitaki are
dominated by Meridian Energy’s hydro dams,
generating a large portion of the country’s
electricity needs. The river also holds
significant traditional and cultural value with
local Maori, and sustains a variety of plant and
animal communities.
The water in the Waitaki catchment is
scarce and valuable in these alternative uses.
With such a wide range of competing water
uses, conflicts of interest can, and do, arise. 
In addition to a number of existing resource
consents, there are currently many more new
applications before local councils for resource
consents to take or use water from the Waitaki
catchment. These include Meridian’s Project
Aqua seeking water for hydro development in
the lower reaches of the river, two large
irrigation proposals and a number of smaller
applications, many also for irrigation purposes.
In response to this growing demand for
Waitaki water, the government has introduced
the Resource Management (Waitaki
Catchment) Amendment Bill (known hereafter
as the Waitaki Bill). Under the current
framework for water allocation in New
Zealand, legislated by the Resource
Management Act (RMA), new applications
would be considered on a first-in first-served
basis. Each application would be assessed
against its effects on the environment and
impact on existing water users. The Waitaki
Bill aims to address what the government
considers to be problems with this existing
water allocation framework. These include the
inability to make a comparative assessment of
competing applications, and an allocation
process that can take a significant time and be
subject to costly delays. The lack of a regional
plan for the Waitaki catchment is seen as an
additional impediment to water allocation in
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the catchment. Although not mandatory under
the RMA, a regional plan arguably should
have already been prepared for a significant
catchment such as the Waitaki.
The situation on the Waitaki River and
the resulting Waitaki Bill gives New Zealand a
timely opportunity to develop a water
allocation framework on a single catchment
that builds on the existing framework of the
RMA and provides a model for the future
allocation of New Zealand’s increasingly scarce
water resources throughout the country.1
In this paper we present the key desirable
aspects of a water allocation framework
suitable for the Waitaki and other catchments,
which is consistent with economically efficient
arrangements and international best practice.
We build on the work of Counsell (2003),
which reviews overseas water arrangements
and highlights the aspects of these
arrangements that could generate benefits for
New Zealand. The water allocation framework
presented in this paper differs somewhat from
that proposed in the Waitaki Bill, but is able to
promote efficient water allocation under
increasing demand as it becomes more
common in New Zealand. The Waitaki is but
one example of water allocation issues that
confront New Zealand.2
Desirable Aspects of a 
Water Allocation Framework
Recent overseas experience has recognised
that increasing demand for water resources
requires new and innovative approaches to
their management that differ from the
traditional riparian and administrative
regimes.3 In this section we outline the key
features of a water allocation framework,
based on this overseas experience, which aims
to address the crucial issues in the Waitaki
catchment. Our proposed water allocation
framework will also serve as a wider
framework for the country as a whole, as
water issues like those facing the Waitaki
become more common in other areas. Indeed,
the ability to serve as a nationwide framework
is a desirable requirement of developments in
water allocation more generally. To suggest
the issues on the Waitaki are unique, and to
treat them differently from other catchments
could cause conflict with water users on other
catchments also wishing to develop the
general RMA framework.
The following list outlines the key
requirements of an efficient water allocation
framework. The list is not intended to be
exclusive or exhaustive, as with any
mechanism for resource allocation there will
always be many issues of detail that are very
important in its operation. Nonetheless, the
following points do represent the broad
aspects of a water allocation framework that
can achieve a more economically efficient
allocation of water while ensuring sustainable
management of the resources.
1. Establish well-defined 
property rights
Any new water allocation framework should
firstly ensure that property rights to water are
clearly defined. A property right entitles the
holder to the use of the resource, although
ownership of a property right does not
necessarily imply ownership of the resource. 
A well-defined property right includes
ensuring a clear specification as to what may
be taken, allowing tradability of rights, and
ensuring rights are not subject to pre-
expiration judicial or governmental review. It
also includes ensuring in-stream rights are
clearly specified, such as through the setting
of minimum flows. Rights should also be
defined so that they are independent of use,
allowing tradability of rights across alternative
uses.
* The authors are grateful for helpful
comments from Phil Barry, Glenn Boyle,
Rod Feller, Graeme Guthrie, Richard
Hawke, Colin Keating, Raewyn Moss and
Tim Stewart. This paper draws heavily on
the earlier research of Counsell (2003).
1 We are not advocating the explicit testing
of legislation on the Waitaki. Rather, that
the situation provides an opportunity for
a generic New Zealand wide water alloca-
tion framework that can be informed
from first principles and overseas
arrangements and experience.
2 It is not our intention in this paper to
argue for or against the water in the
Waitaki River being allocated to a particu-
lar use. We merely present the key
aspects of a framework for making these
allocation decisions, which provides an
approach to achieving sustainable
management of water resources that
better caters for increasing demand and
competition.
3 Improved water allocation institutions
have recently been put in place in
countries that include Australia, England,
Wales, Mexico and Chile.
S U P P L E M E N T  –  M A R C H  2 0 0 4 –  PAG E  3
The duration of rights is another element
of well-defined rights. An indefinite time-limit
ensures continued access to water and
therefore encourages investment.4
Nonetheless, preserving the status quo of
New Zealand’s current system by allowing
periodic review of water rights may be more
socially acceptable. If this is the case, then at
the very least, rights should be defined so that
their duration is significant enough to
encourage investment and innovation.5 There
should also be a relatively straightforward and
costless ‘presumption of renewal’ provided
water has been, and will continue to be, used
in a relatively efficient and environmentally
sustainable manner.6 Significant alteration to
consent conditions on renewal is undesirable
as it creates uncertainty regarding the scope of
potential investments.
Ensuring well-defined rights is partic-
ularly important for water rights associated
with non-consumptive uses. Water for non-
consumptive uses such as hydro-generation is
returned to the river and, under New
Zealand’s current allocation system, is
available to downstream users. However, this
creates an incongruity between those who
generate the return flows and those who use
them. As the water right for a non-
consumptive use does not endow the holder
with the right to the return flows, there is no
incentive for that water user to ensure either
the timing or volume of return flows is
appropriate for downstream users. In Chile,
for example, this has caused significant
conflict between hydro-generators and
downstream irrigators over the timing and
nature of hydro releases. In a paper outlining
the evolution of water rights, Scott and
Coustalin (1995) suggest that future water
rights should endow the rights to return flows
with those who generate them. The right to
the use of these return flows by downstream
users can then be developed through
bargaining and contractual arrangements
between competing users. Defining rights for
non-consumptive uses in this way on the
Waitaki would help resolve conflicts over
releases between hydro-generators and users
downstream of their dams. It would also
facilitate trading in water (see point 4 below),
as the nature of the right is exactly the same
whether used for a consumptive or non-
consumptive use,7 enabling water to move
between different uses more readily.
2. Re-allocate existing rights based on
historical use
Any new water rights regime requires some
mechanism for the initial allocation of water
rights. The two common mechanisms are
grandfathering – or allocating based on
historical usage – and auctioning. Auctions
allocate rights to those who value them the
most and, in the process, discover the price of
water. Allocating water rights by auction will
generally be efficient for rights to unallocated
water.8
Grandfathering of rights to water already
allocated under a previous allocation
framework ensures the protection of existing
rights and existing investments. It is a widely
accepted principle that in the creation of new
water rights regimes, existing rights should be
re-allocated based on historical usage, to
ensure fairness and social acceptance (in
addition to the normal economic efficiency of
historical usage in the presence of tradability).9
Existing rights were grandfathered when the
RMA implemented a new water rights regime
to replace that of the Water and Soil
Conservation Act 1967. Section 386 of the
RMA ensured that existing water rights
acquired under the WSCA were valid as
resource consents under the RMA with their
existing conditions.10 Such a provision is
crucial to any new rights regime.11
4 An indefinite time-limit does not preclude
reallocation of water rights provided
tradability of rights is allowed.
5 A duration of 35 years (the maximum
time-limit on resource consents under the
RMA) would probably be sufficient to
encourage investment. However, many
existing water rights only have a duration
of 5 to 15 years, which would be too
short for many investments.
6 This is the case under new legislation to
be introduced in England and Wales,
where water rights are issued for 12 years
with a presumption of renewal if certain
environmental and resource use
conditions are met.
7 Indeed, there is little difference between
a non-consumptive hydro-generator who
can store water and return it to the river
at a later date, and a consumptive user
such as an irrigator, who consumes water
of which a portion may be returned to a
groundwater resource through infiltration
over time. The key difference is only in
the timing and nature of their return
flows.
8 There is a vast literature on the ability of
auctions to deliver the socially desirable
outcome, see for example Krishna
(2002).
9 See for example Simpson (1994) and
Thobani (1997). These authors advocate
allocation based on past usage for the
initial allocation of rights in a water
market, although the same result holds
for any new rights regime.
10 However, the RMA did impose on most
of these rights a duration of only 10 years
before renewal was required.
11 Grandfathering of existing rights does not
preclude the transfer of these rights to
higher value uses.
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3. Develop a system to manage 
water variability
Variability in water flows requires a system to
manage the effect that ongoing changes in
water availability has on water users. One way
to do this is by defining priorities on water
rights. A high or senior priority user has the
right of water use over a more junior priority in
times of scarcity.12 Such a system works best
with a functioning water market, as it allows
risk management by water users. Water users
can hold a portfolio of different priority rights
that provides more certainty in water flows to
the user’s desired risk level. For example, a
hydro-generator requires significant water
supplies in winter when demand for electricity
is high. Hence, they may choose to hold a
senior water right giving certainty in supply. 
A portion of this senior right could be
temporarily traded with an irrigator in summer,
who requires more certainty in supply due to
generally drier conditions in that season.
An alternative system, and one that can
work for allocating water within the priority
groupings, is to allow proportional sharing. In
times of low flow, all users would have their
allocations proportionately reduced.
Proportional adjustments would also apply in
times of high flows, so that users would
receive additional water. Such a system avoids
the need to rely on administrative decisions to
determine whom water should be allocated to
in times of scarcity. Both the proportional and
priority systems require water trading for them
to foster efficiency.
Priority and proportional systems are
common in parts of New Zealand. For
example, on the Waimakariri River
Environment Canterbury issues ‘A’ and ‘B’
permits, with ‘A’ permit holders having priority.
The Wellington Regional Council allows
proportional allocations on some of the rivers
in the region. As the flow on a river
approaches the minimum flow, there are
designated flow cut-off points at which rights
holders must reduce their extractions. These
types of priority and proportional systems are
not mentioned in the existing legislation and
are only implemented on an ad hoc basis. An
effective water allocation framework would
ensure provision is made for these systems.
4. Establish a functioning water market
A water market allows a water user to trade all
or part of their water right on a temporary or
permanent basis, so that water can move to its
highest societal valued use.13 A market also
allows potential water users to purchase water
when there would otherwise be none available
under an administrative allocation. For
example, in a recent Environment Court
decision it was noted that the Upper Waitaki is
fully allocated to Meridian and other existing
users. Although the decision is under appeal, if
it is upheld then it is difficult for a new user to
gain access to this water unless they agree
with Meridian (and any other affected parties)
that the application to use water shall not be
challenged. Such a process has significant
transaction costs and is unlikely to result in
efficient use of water over time. However, if a
water market existed where rights were well-
defined and tradable, then the use of the
water could be traded between existing and
potential users. In this case, a potential water
user in the Upper Waitaki could negotiate and
purchase a portion of any existing user’s water
rights, entitling the new user to water they
would otherwise not have. An existing user
would, on a commercial basis, release water to
higher value uses than its own.
A water market requires more than just
an allowance of trading specified in the
legislation. It requires institutional
arrangements that encourage and facilitate
trading.14 These arrangements would include:
12 Of course the criteria for determining the
initial allocation of priorities will have to
be determined. In the Western United
States priorities are ranked on a first-in-
time basis.
13 The societal value of water in its various
applications will generally be represented
by private values in exchange, particu-
larly where externalities peculiar to
industries that make any use of water are
priced properly (for example, in the case
of CO2 emissions deemed to be an
externality, when there is a carbon tax).
14 Note that a large number of trades or a
formal trading exchange are not
necessary for a water market to be of
benefit. The evolution of markets reflects
the transaction costs of trading as well as
the intrinsic nature of the goods. As a
consequence, markets take various
forms.
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• a single public registry recording the full
ownership details of water rights and the
details of rights transfers.
• an effective volumetric monitoring
system to record amounts abstracted
and return flows at all sites.
• a catchment users association or water
brokers to facilitate the flow of
information on water availability and
trades.15
A water market itself is also not
constrained to being purely a spot market. The
use of derivative instruments such as option
contracts for water would further facilitate
trading and generate efficiency gains.
Overseas experience in water markets is
demonstrating that these markets can
generate significant benefits. In Australia,
McKay and Bjornlund (2001) report that water
markets in Victoria, South Australia and New
South Wales have allowed water to move to
irrigators producing higher value crops and
with more efficient irrigation technology. This
has lead to economic benefits that include
both positive environmental outcomes (such
as a reduction in polluted water draining back
into waterways) and social outcomes (such as
the improved allocation of water and
profitability of irrigators generating jobs in
small communities).
The example of Australia shows that
significant efficiency gains can be realised
when irrigators can trade water between
themselves. When water is not scarce, it is
more efficient (when capital costs are
included) to use low capital, low water
efficiency irrigation methods such as border
dykes. However as scarcity increases, then
border dyke irrigators can reduce their water
consumption by investing in capital equipment
such as spray systems. The excess water
available can then be transferred to other
irrigators. The efficiency and suitability of
various irrigation systems will vary depending
on the circumstances, and it is only
understood by those who know the activity
and accept the risks of the enterprises that use
water. Thus, how the balance of capital and
water efficiency use is managed is best left to
decentralised trades.
5. Provide an effective regulatory 
and administrative system
Notwithstanding the benefits water markets
can generate, there is still an important role for
an administrative body (which may be local
government) in an effective water allocation
framework. For example, recent reforms in
Australia have recognised the need for
administrative bodies by requiring state
governments to undertake comprehensive
planning processes in relation to the allocation
of water resources. Where water resources are
not fully allocated, administrative allocation by
local government under the current system of
the RMA is a constructive way to allocate
excess water. Although there are problems
with this first-in first-served system when
demand exceeds supply, the addition of a
water market would resolve this by
incentivising reallocation of water to higher
valued uses. First-in first-served is a sensible
approach to allocating a resource that is not
scarce.
The administrative body would also play
a valuable regulatory role in the trading of
water rights, particularly with regard to the
enforcement of property rights. Trades can
have significant effects on third parties –
particularly where trading of upstream rights
influences water available to downstream
users. Thus, trades to a location upstream of
the current location would require adminis-
trative approval (based on the approval of
affected users upstream of the current
location) to ensure that adverse third party
15 A regular newsletter such as the recently
developed Catchment Waitaki Newsletter
would also help facilitate information
exchange. The Internet is also a valuable
tool in lowering the costs of information
exchange, and regional councils are
increasingly using it in relation to water
resources.
S U P P L E M E N T  –  M A R C H  2 0 0 4  –  PAG E  6
effects are avoided or compensated for before
trades can proceed. More generally, an
administrative body is required to ensure the
correct application of water property rights.
Additionally, regulation of monopoly
behaviour in water trading may be another
important role to be played by an adminis-
trative body.16
6. Build on the current framework
The existing water allocation framework
provided by the RMA is not in dire need of a
complete reform. It does create a good
underlying basis for an efficient allocation
system, which requires some fine-tuning of
particular aspects as mentioned above. The
RMA also has the advantage that a significant
amount of case law has already been
established about its processes. Incorporating
the right institutional arrangements and clearly
specified property rights into the existing
framework would improve existing outcomes
in relation to water allocation. Indeed,
particular aspects of the RMA – such as setting
aside minimum flows for environmental uses –
are similar to features that are considered an
integral part of overseas water reform
programs, such as in Australia. Furthermore,
there do exist institutional structures in place
that would facilitate the operation of an
efficient allocation mechanism, as we outline in
the next section. A desirable water allocation
framework would build on the platform
provided by the RMA and these structures.
Valuing Water in 
a Water Market
In the previous section we outlined some of
the benefits that would result from allowing
trading of water rights through the
establishment of a water market. An important
requirement for a water market to work well is
that water users have information on
competing inputs and outputs to the uses of
water and on the value of water. It is for this
reason that a catchment users association can
facilitate trades by allowing the free flow of
information on water values. Despite the lack
of water-specific arrangements like this in New
Zealand, there are other existing structures in
place that provide information on the value of
water. In particular, wholesale electricity prices
provide a lower bound for the value of water
on rivers with existing hydro-generation. The
rationale for this is sketched in this section. It is
a relatively specific aspect of the general
framework presented in this paper,
nonetheless it is an illustrative and important
part of enabling the efficient use of water in
New Zealand.
That electricity prices provide the
minimum water value is relatively intuitive. At
a point on a river upstream of a single hydro
power station, the value of water to the hydro-
generator is given by the price at which it sells
electricity.17 If the value of water in an
alternative use at the same point were lower
than this price, an efficient market would
allocate water to the higher value use of
electricity (as the alternative user would be
worse off by paying a price for water that is
greater than the value they attach to it). Thus,
the wholesale price of electricity at the
relevant network node gives the minimum
value of water at points on the river upstream
of the power station.
The non-consumptive use of water by a
chain of hydro stations affects the value of
water entering the top of the chain. Consider
water at a point upstream of several power
stations. As water must pass through a number
of stations, it is more valuable than water
downstream with fewer power stations to pass
through. This is because the minimum value of
water at any point will be the sum of the
electricity prices at all downstream nodes – so
16 Nonetheless, the ability to trade water
rights – even in a market with monopoly
behaviour – will be more efficient than
the monopoly implied by the complete
absence of tradability.
17 Strictly, the value of a unit of water in
electricity generation is the value of the
electricity it generates less the cost of any
other resources used. In the short-term,
where these costs are fixed, units of
water can be measured so that their value
is the price of electricity. The ability to
store water creates a timing option in the
generation of electricity and therefore
adds a premium to this value.
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that the more power stations water will pass
through, the higher its value. By implication, as
water flows downstream through successive
power stations, it becomes less valuable in its
electricity use.
The value of water provided by the
electricity market also reflects environmental
constraints on water used for electricity
generation. For example, river heating by
Huntly power station and reservoir levels on
the Waikato River are subject to environmental
rules specified in the conditions of resource
consents. The provision of minimum flows to
the lower Waitaki for abstractive users and to
protect in-stream values is another example.
These rules are designed to maintain or
enhance the environment. The price of
electricity at the relevant network nodes
values these constraints on water use when
they are operative.18
The electricity market values the scarcity
of water both across the country and across
alternative electricity generation fuels, in
addition to valuing the effect of environmental
constraints.19 It thereby encourages water use
that promotes national economic efficiency.
The across-region effect is illustrated by the
case where hydro-lake inflows have been low
in one region of the country and high in
others. Setting aside the role of other
electricity generation fuels, the price of
electricity at any location on the National Grid
appropriately reflects the higher (lower)
electricity production from regions with the
relatively lower (greater) scarcity of water.
Hence, the electricity market discovers the
value of water in electricity at hydro locations,
effectively accounting for water scarcity, and it
appropriately allocates water used for
electricity. It conveys the value of water in
electricity production (and consequently the
minimum value of water) across the country.20
Similarly, the price of electricity reflects
the price and substitutability of fuels other
than water: gas for example. If gas generation
is setting the price of electricity then it is also
determining the value of water for electricity
being generated in hydro-generation
locations. This is because if one more unit of
electricity was supplied by hydro-generation,
the benefit would be the price of the gas-
supplied generation it substituted for. If the
price of gas were to increase, then the value of
water in generating electricity, and thereby
other uses, would also increase.21 Thus, the
electricity market is conveying the value of
water for those catchments that have hydro
generation, taking into account the price and
availability of other fuels no matter where their
generation is located.
The coordinated water value function
that results from the issues explored in this
section is an illustration of the efficiency gains
available from trading – where water moves to
its highest value uses. Thus, it is important that
the use of water is flexible so that both within-
industry and cross-industry transfers can
occur. For example, it is easy to imagine a
situation, perhaps lasting only a few weeks or
months, where the use of water is better for
irrigation than generation, or vice versa. In
such circumstances, low cost, quick and
simple transfers could save a valuable crop or
address energy shortages such as those seen
in recent years. The wise application of water
should therefore reflect all its potential uses. It
would be enhanced by a mechanism with
institutional arrangements that built on existing
frameworks, such as the RMA and the
wholesale electricity market as described
above.
Water Allocation Under 
the Waitaki Bill
The Waitaki Bill seeks to allocate the water in
the Waitaki in a more effective way than that
18 The valuation of water as an input in the
electricity market gives the cost or value
of relaxing the operative constraint; in
this way it values the trade-off between
water used for electricity and for the
environment.
19 Moreover, storage allows water to be
substituted across time for whatever use.
The electricity market also values the
scarcity of water across time, as may
markets for irrigation water.
20 The behaviour of wholesale electricity
prices is not inconsistent with how the
price of water should behave. Low lake
inflows into southern hydro lakes in the
winters of 2001 and 2003 led to high
wholesale electricity prices. This is
perfectly consistent with the way water
prices should move in water markets:
scarcity forces prices up to create
incentives to conserve water.
21 This is consistent with the results of
Guthrie and Videbeck (2003), which
show that the prices at a sample of nodes
in the New Zealand electricity market
show significantly similar movements to
suggest there is generally one and
occasionally at most two separate
markets across all nodes.
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available under the first-in first-served
approach of the existing legislation. Indeed,
the stated public policy objective of the
Waitaki Bill is "to create a decision-making
process that results in equitable, efficient, and
transparent decisions on competing uses of
water in the Waitaki catchment for both
existing and future uses".  It is therefore useful
to consider how the framework proposed by
the Bill sits in relation to the desirable aspects
presented above. In the following sections we
firstly outline the approach taken by the
Waitaki Bill and then consider, based on our
interpretation of the Bill, the points on which it
differs from the framework we have proposed.
To establish a method of allocating the
water in the Waitaki River, the Bill outlines
three specific courses of action: setting up a
Water Allocation Board, establishing a water
allocation framework and creating a Panel of
Commissioners. The primary function of the
Water Allocation Board is to develop and
approve the water allocation framework, which
details the way water is to be allocated in the
Waitaki catchment. The Board is made up of at
most five members appointed by the Minister
for the Environment. The Bill provides no
indication of the criteria by which they are to
be appointed.
The water allocation framework itself will
become a regional plan for the Waitaki
catchment. Although the framework’s
inclusions and exclusions are the responsibility
of the Board, the Waitaki Bill does specify
some matters that must be included. These
matters give a reasonable picture of the way
water is to be allocated under the framework.
The framework must firstly specify the
amount of water set aside for in-stream values
(including Maori values) and for current and
likely future domestic, stock water and fire
fighting purposes. Following that, the
framework will define the amount of water that
is available to be allocated to other competing
uses. Implied here, although not explicitly
stated in the Bill, is some measure of the total
water available in the Waitaki catchment. 22
Given the water available for competing
uses, the Board must decide how much water
is available to present and likely future
categories of competing uses. That is, it
decides how much water is available for
hydro-generation, how much for irrigation and
so on. In making these allocation decisions the
Board must apply a three-step process. It
firstly applies the purpose and principles of
Part II of the RMA.23 Secondly, it considers the
benefits and costs of each particular water use
from a national perspective, which includes
the regional and local benefits and costs.24
Finally, the Board takes into account existing
resource consents on the Waitaki, although
this does not give explicit protection to
existing rights. As existing rights are
considered last in the priority order, it is
possible the allocation framework could
impede such rights.
Once the framework is specified, it is
subject to a process similar to that used for
regional council plans. The framework is
publicly notified and subject to submissions,
which are to be considered at a hearing held
by the Board. Following this, the framework
must be approved by a majority decision by
the Board. Once approved, the decision may
be appealed to the High Court, although only
on matters relating to the application of the
law.
With the framework approved, a
separate Panel of Commissioners is appointed
by the Minister for the Environment to
consider individual applications for resource
consent in the Waitaki catchment. Members of
the Panel are nominated by local authorities
and so will mainly be people from the local
area,25 although the Minister may also make
22 That is: if A equals the total water
available in the catchment, and B equals
the water set aside for in-stream,
domestic, stock water and fire fighting,
then A – B equals the water available for
other competing uses. The Bill gives no
indication, however, of the method for
determining the total water available.
Volatility in flows and the impact of
storage lakes will make this a difficult task
in that available water will vary over
location and time.
23 This ensures (among other things) that
the water use has no adverse effects on
the environment and does not impinge
on the reasonably foreseeable needs of
future users. The latter requirement is
quite general and the RMA provides little
guidance as to how it is to be
implemented.
24 The Bill does not clearly specify the
treatment of any trade-offs between local
(or regional) and national interests.
25 The Waitaki River comes under the
domain of the Canterbury Regional
Council. However, other relevant local
authorities are the Otago Regional
Council and the Waitaki, Waimate,
McKenzie and Timaru District Councils.
direct appointments to the Panel.26 The Panel
has the powers and functions of a regional
council, although unlike a regional council it
does not have to consider applications for
water on a first-in first-served basis. The Panel
may make a comparative assessment of
competing applications, firstly by applying Part
II of the RMA and then by cost-benefit analysis
from a national perspective. The final decisions
on individual applications must be made in
accordance with the water allocation
framework. Some applications may be passed
from the Panel to the appropriate local
authority, which must also make decisions
based on the framework.
As with ordinary resource consent
decisions, those made by the Panel or a local
authority may be appealed to the Environment
Court. However the Bill introduces a number
of measures to reduce delays that often occur
in this process. The Environment Court is to
take a rehearing approach, where those
appealing cannot introduce new evidence not
already heard by the Panel. The Court may
also conduct a preliminary review of the
appeal to ensure the case is actually worthy of
the Court’s time. As with ordinary resource
consent decisions made by the Environment
Court, questions of law may be appealed to
the High Court.
How Does the Bill Fit a
Desirable Framework?
The allocation framework presented in the
Waitaki Bill has numerous aspects that are
likely to be contentious and will be vigorously
debated during its approval stages. However,
the argument here is not focussed on these
relatively detailed issues. It is that the overall
economic framework of the Waitaki Bill does
not include certain features that are suggested
as being desirable requirements of an efficient
water allocation framework. Thus it is unlikely
to be an effective model for future water
allocation issues in the country as a whole.
Although the Bill does have some positive
aspects, such as its attempt to reduce the
costly delays of the existing planning process,27
it places too much reliance on central planning
and administrative allocation of water
resources without provision for key aspects
identified earlier.28
The Waitaki Bill shifts a significant
portion of decision-making from the local
government (or decentralised) level to the
central government level.29 This represents a
move away from a key premise underlying the
RMA: that decision-making on resource
allocation should be made at the level closest
to the actual resource. This view, endorsed by
the Brundtland Commission and Agenda 21
reports on sustainable development,30 allows
improvements in efficiency and accountability
by ensuring decisions are made by those who
bear the consequences. As Hawke (2003)
notes, centralised decision-making can result
in problems such as an inability to achieve a
consensus that fits the preferences of any 
sub-group of society and an allocation of
resources that is based on only a single view 
of the trade-offs relating to any consent.
The requirement in the Bill to base
planning decisions on cost-benefit analysis is 
a common feature of centrally planned
decisions, but such analysis is relatively
subjective and relies heavily on underlying
assumptions.31 There is an incentive for the
water claimant to underestimate costs and
overestimate benefits in order to attain their
favoured allocation. Such a system is an
undesirable method for resource allocation
where other methods are possible, and the
misallocation that results is common with
centrally planned investment decisions.32
The Waitaki Bill and the RMA itself also
place considerable weight on the allocation of
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26 The Bill does not specify what level or
type of expertise is required of Panel
members.
27 The trade-off with this, however, is that
procedural rights of affected parties
become more limited. Further research is
required to work through the implications
of this trade-off. The other obvious
corollary is if it is efficient to reduce
delays as per the Bill for a particular
catchment, then it will be efficient to do
so more widely – at the national level.
28 In this paper we do not consider the
political economy issues that generally
affect central planning institutions, such
as which particular political and economic
interests will be influential, and the social
costs of these interests being expressed
in the absence of a market (see for
example Noll, 1989).
29 Although the Bill does aim to preserve
some form of decentralised decision-
making by ensuring the Panel of
Commissioners is made up of local
representatives, allocation decisions by
the Water Allocation Board are made at
the central government level.
30 See respectively WCED (1987) and
UNCED (1992).
31 In the existing legislation, section 32 of
the RMA requires cost-benefit analysis
for most rules, policies and methods in
regional council planning.
32 See the examples in Evans and Quigley
(2003, p.7).
water by an administrative body. Allocation by
administrative fiat (regardless of whether it is
at a decentralised or centralised level) without
the possibility of reallocation by market partic-
ipants (i.e. exchanging) means water is not
necessarily going to those who value it the
most. Concomitantly, the Waitaki Bill does not
account for changes over time in the way users
value water, as allocations by the Board are
made at a one-off point in time. The absence
of a reallocation mechanism also means that
once water is allocated users have no incentive
to implement conservation measures. Without
the ability to resell water, a water user faces no
opportunity cost from wasting or consuming
too much, thus giving no incentive to prevent
such habits.33 Moreover, if water users are
unable to trade water rights then reallocation
must be administrative. The criteria by which
rights are reallocated will be subject to
administrative decision-making, limiting the
certainty of water rights and investments that
utilise them.
Although the Waitaki Bill does include
provision for trading of water rights, this is
only in accordance with the existing section
136 of the RMA (and so is not directly attrib-
utable to the Bill), and little trading under this
section has taken place to date. Section 136
allows water users to trade all or part of their
right to the same site or another site in the
same catchment, provided it is allowed in the
regional plan and approved by the regional
council. However, the right institutional
arrangements need to be in place for trading
to occur, ones that minimise the transaction
costs of reallocation. But both the Waitaki Bill
and the RMA are silent on such arrangements.
There are two other aspects of the Bill
that are worth noting, which do not conform to
the desirable aspects identified earlier. Firstly,
the Bill provides no protection for existing
rights. This would have serious consequences
for current and future investment decisions
made by water users. Existing investments by
water users have been made under the
certainty of a predefined time-limit on the
water right. To truncate this time-limit and alter
the nature of existing rights will, at best,
reduce the value of existing investments or, at
worst, lead to stranded assets, and signal that
this may happen again in the future. The risk
this creates that rights may be expropriated in
the future could deter investment by water
users.
The second point is the difficulty in
making a one-off measurement of the total
amount of water available. A distinctive feature
of water is that flows are variable, thus the
total water available is never constant. This
volatility has short-term, cyclical and trend
elements. To have institutional arrangements
that do not provide for the management of
these, as seemingly the Bill does, could result
in significant conflicts between users in the
future.34 For example, consider the situation
when flows are significantly lower than those
used by the Water Allocation Board to
calculate the total water available. As water
rights are defined volumetrically, an upstream
user may still be able to satisfy their entire
water allocation but, as flows are low, there will
be insufficient water available to meet a
downstream user’s allocation. The upstream
user’s priority due solely to their geographic
location is inefficient if it cannot be traded. 
The situation could be resolved by specifying
tradable contractual priorities or allowing
proportional reductions to both users in times
of low flow.
Conclusion
The situation on the Waitaki of increasing
demand for water and intense competition
between water users is not a unique, one-off
occurrence. With increasing population and
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33 See Counsell (2003, p. 19) for a review of
reallocation through water trading rather
than administrative fiat.
34 Water demands will also change over
time and climate change may alter the
total amount of water available.
incomes, and demand for commodities and
services that New Zealand produces, comes
increasing demand for water and goods that
use water as an input: these include electricity,
agricultural products, recreation and environ-
mental demands. Thus, there is a need to
manage water resources in a way that satisfies
competing demands in an efficient manner
that applies water to its most societal valued
use including environmental stewardship. 
The situation on the Waitaki provides an
excellent opportunity to develop a framework
to achieve just that, but is just one example of
New Zealand catchments with competing
demands for water.
Governments worldwide are responding
to increasing demands for water by developing
legislation and institutions that provide
incentives for more efficient allocation and
management of water resources. In Australia,
for example, nationwide reform of the water
sector has been underway since 1994, and
indications are that it is progressing well and
delivering beneficial changes. In England and
Wales there is currently a Bill before
parliament that aims to improve the way these
countries allocate their water resources. 
These arrangements generally have the 
central feature of enhanced tradability and 
preservation of existing rights.
Aspects of the framework presented in
the Waitaki Bill differ from recent develop-
ments in other countries. There is a need for a
framework that balances administrative and
market allocation mechanisms, while allowing
for the unique characteristics of water as a
dynamic, flowing resource. Market
mechanisms, including associated property
rights, are an essential part of an effective
allocation framework. While such a framework
is not a panacea, and not easy to implement, it
is a necessary step to manage New Zealand’s
scarce and precious water resources well for
the foreseeable future.
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